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ABSTRACT. By enacting equality laws the liberal state decides the limits of liberal
tolerance by relying on content-based rather than content-neutral considerations.
Equality laws are not and cannot be neutral. They reflect a content-based moral
decision about the importance and weight of the principle of equality vis-à-vis
other rights or interests. This leads to the following conclusions: First, since
equality laws in liberal democracies reflect moral-liberal values, conscientious
objections to equality laws rely, almost by definition, on unjustly intolerant, anti-
liberal and morally repugnant values. Secondly, we should not shy away from
explicitly relying on moral-liberal views when deciding whether it is justified to
grant exemptions from equality laws. Thirdly, conscientious objections to equality
laws should normally not be tolerated or accommodated by the state, because
conscientious objections that rely on what is rightly perceived as unjustly intol-
erant, anti-liberal and morally repugnant values should not be tolerated in a
tolerant-liberal democracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the UK, in cases of religious conscientious objection, including to
anti-discrimination laws, courts consistently apply a neutral rhetoric
which almost completely ignores the moral soundness or legitimacy
of the relevant conscience. The courts almost always avoid making
any normative judgment about the content of the relevant con-
science. Instead, they decide the cases before them while relying
mostly on content-neutral justifications.
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Here it is argued that the state, through the judiciary, must take a
moral stand in cases of conscientious objection and differentiate
between two types of cases:
Type 1: claims for exemption or accommodation that are directly based on
repugnant, unjustly intolerant, anti-liberal and ultimately illegitimate
values.
Type 2: claims that are based on values that may be irrational or morally
misguided but are not necessarily unjustly intolerant or morally illegit-
imate.
Normative evaluation of the content of the conscience provides a
weighty reason (though not necessarily a conclusive one) for not
tolerating Type 1 – and for tolerating Type 2, under certain condi-
tions. Even though I will aim to briefly outline the differences be-
tween cases of Type 1 and cases of Types 2, this paper will only
analyse and evaluate cases of Type 1 – and within the context of
equality laws.1
The normative argument according to which the judiciary must
take a moral rather than a neutral stand in cases of conscientious
objection is complemented by a descriptive argument according to
which the legislature often does take a moral stand when it enacts
the law from which an exemption is sought. Alternatively, and in
case of lack of explicit or coherent legislative intention, it is argued
that equality laws will become meaningless, at least to some extent,
if a moral stand is not taken while applying them. It will therefore be
morally and legally inconsistent if the courts refuse to take moral
stand when deciding whether to grant conscientious exemptions as a
judicial remedy to those who object to the law for moral-conscien-
tious reasons.
In the following it is also argued that (a) accommodating con-
scientious objections is almost always an expression of tolerance; (b)
deciding whether to accommodate conscientious objections means
deciding the limits of tolerance; and (c) the judicial decision about
the limits of tolerance within the context of accommodating con-
scientious objection should be made by relying on content-based
1 For an in-depth discussion of cases of type 2, see Yossi Nehushtan and Stella Coyle, ‘The Difference
between Illegitimate Conscience and Misguided Conscience: Equality Laws, Abortion Laws and Reli-
gious Symbols’, (forthcoming) in John Adenitire, (ed.), Religious and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal
State (Hart Publishing, Oxford [2019]).
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rather than content-neutral considerations – especially when the law
itself reflects or relies on content-based considerations.
These arguments will be established by referring to recent UK
cases involving religious claims to be exempted from equality laws,
and more specifically – cases involving a refusal to sell a ‘gay mar-
riage’ cake and a refusal to provide services to same-sex couples. The
examples will focus on non-discrimination laws in the commercial
context. Therefore, the sort of equality at issue is not equality with
respect to government action, but equality with respect to decisions
of private actors. The main arguments, however, are applicable,
with necessary modifications, beyond the context of decisions of
private actors in the commercial context, yet these broader impli-
cations will not be discussed here.
II. ACCOMMODATING CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE LIMITS
OF TOLERANCE
The starting point of the discussion is the assertion, which will not be
defended or explored in depth here, that accommodating conscien-
tious objection, typically by granting conscientious exemptions from
the application of the law or of administrative policies, is usually the
outcome of tolerance.2
Here, tolerance is understood as refraining from harming the
‘other’ although the tolerant person has good reasons (in her opin-
ion) to harm that ‘other’. The tolerant person makes an adverse
judgment about another person, the adverse judgment provides the
tolerant person with reasons to harm the other, but the tolerant
person restrains herself and avoids harming the other. These three
elements of (a) adverse judgment, (b) reasons for causing harm and
(c) restraint, differentiate the concept and the attitude of tolerance
from concepts such as respect or acceptance. Here, and for the
purpose of this paper, it will be assumed – without trying to justify
the following assertions – that first, the term ‘harm’ should be
interpreted in the broadest way possible so as to include any negative
2 For a detailed argument according to which granting conscientious exemptions is normally an
expression of tolerance, see Yossi Nehushtan ‘What Are Conscientious Exemptions Really About?’
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2(2) (2013): pp. 393–416. For a critical discussion of the argument that
the principle of tolerance better explains the practice of granting conscientious exemptions, see John
Adenitire, ‘Conscientious Exemptions: From Toleration to Neutrality; From Neutrality to Respect’
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 6(2) (2017): pp. 268–292.
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behaviour towards another – and any limitations imposed on an-
other’s freedom; second, a person is harmed as long as her condition
is worsened according to her own perspective; and thirdly, harm to
others might also be caused by omission.
The principle of tolerance better explains both the practice of
accommodating conscientious objection by granting conscientious
exemptions and the attitude of those who grant the exemptions.
Typically, granting conscientious exemptions from a legal rule pre-
supposes that the state does not share the conscientious objector’s
values or their way of balancing between values, or believes it would
be unbearable and indeed intolerable if everyone shared the objec-
tor’s kind of conscience and reasoning. Otherwise, the exemption
would have been the general rule rather than the exception to it.
When the state, for example, grants exemptions from equality
laws to religious organisations, the state morally disapproves the
religious conscience that prescribes discrimination against protected
groups (most commonly – on the basis of sex, sexual orientation and
religion). If the state perceived the religious discriminatory con-
science or practice as morally desirable, it would not have enacted
equality laws to begin with. Exemptions from equality laws are often
granted only to religious organisations. This may lead to perceiving
these exemptions as an expression of favouritism rather than toler-
ance. This perception is only partly true. Religious organisations do
get special, positive treatment within the context of equality laws –
but the true meaning of this favouritism is that religious organisa-
tions are the only ones that are being tolerated by the state. This
unique mixture of favouritism and tolerance does not contradict the
argument that granting conscientious exemptions is almost always
an expression of tolerance.
The same argument applies to cases in which the state exempts
pacifists from compulsory enlistment to the army; religious groups
from compulsory education laws; or physicians from performing
abortions. If the state morally approved these types of conscience, it
would not have enacted compulsory enlistment laws; compulsory
education laws and permissive abortion laws.
The state usually makes an adverse judgment about the consci-
entious objector’s values or their way of balancing between values.
This judgment gives the state reasons not to grant the conscientious
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objector an exemption from a legal rule – or more generally – not to
accommodate the objection, thereby harming the objector. If the
state decides to grant conscientious exemptions after all, it can be
seen as tolerant. The state may tolerate conscientious objections for
pragmatic reasons – and that would be an expression of pragmatic
tolerance; or for principled reasons – and that would be a case of
principled tolerance where the state acknowledges the conscientious
objector’s right to be tolerated.
The argument that granting conscientious exemptions – or more
generally – accommodating conscientious objection, is in most cases
the outcome of tolerance, may be seen too broad. For the purpose of
this article, however, there is no need to subscribe to this broad
argument. A narrower argument can be suggested, according to
which granting conscientious exemptions – or more generally –
accommodating conscientious objection, is almost always the out-
come of tolerance in cases where the relevant general rule is not
morally neutral, i.e. in cases where the general rule reflects a moral
view. As will be argued below, this is always the case when the
liberal state enacts equality laws.
One possible objection to the argument that granting exemptions
from equality laws is almost always the outcome of tolerance is that
in more than a few typical cases, the court or the legislature are
struggling to determine the legitimate boundaries not of tolerance
but of the scope of the law and the legitimate powers of the state.3
The law, for example, may prohibit landlords from refusing to let
their property on the basis of race. The law may also decide that this
rule does not apply when the property is a bedroom in one’s small
house. Alternatively, the court may decide to exempt landlords in
these cases from the general non-discrimination rule, even in lack of
statutory exemption. It can be argued that allowing home-owners to
discriminate on the basis of race in that specific case is not an
expression of tolerance but rather a recognition (that perhaps can
coincide with perfectionist liberalism) that there are compelling
reasons against enforcing the principle of equality in this case. The
fact is, however, that in many cases determining the boundaries of
the law and the powers of the state means determining the limits of
tolerance as well. In the example above, the legislature and the court
3 And I thank the anonymous reviewer for indicating that point and giving the example that follows.
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(or simply ‘the state’) make adverse judgment about racist landlords
– if this is indeed a liberal state. This judgment gives the state reasons
to apply the non-discrimination rule in all cases (therefore harming
racist landlords). The liberal state also has reasons against applying
the non-discrimination rule in some cases. In our case, the reason
against applying the non-discrimination rule could be the right to
privacy or the well-known liberal distinction between the public and
the private sphere. If the state acts on these reasons by exempting
landlords from the application of the law in defined cases, the state is
in fact tolerant towards these landlords. This reasoning applies, so I
argue, with regard to all laws that reflect and enforce moral views
about the way people should behave.
Since the practice of granting conscientious exemptions from laws
which reflect a moral view is an expression of tolerance, it is closely
related to the complex question of the limits of tolerance. And if the
state is generally a liberal state, the exact question will be that of the
limits of liberal tolerance. There are various ways of not tolerating
intolerant conscientious objectors – or any objectors to obeying laws
that reflect moral views. The authorities may grant them an
exemption but condemn their values or behaviour. The authorities
may also grant them an exemption and, at the same time, deny them
any governmental support or subsidy. In appropriate cases, the
authorities can also refuse to grant an exemption. The state should
always express an attitude of intolerance towards unjustly intolerant
conscientious objectors. The exact nature of that attitude may vary.
The limits of tolerance towards conscientious objectors can be
decided by applying one of two possible approaches: taking into
account content-neutral considerations or taking into account con-
tent-based considerations. It is possible, of course, to apply both
approaches, but a decision will have to be made as to which ap-
proach prevails or should be accorded more weight. If the legislature
takes a liberal-moral stand when it enacts the law from which an
exemption is claimed, then those who object to the law for consci-
entious reasons and whose conscience does not rely on intolerant –
and to a lesser extent – irrational values or beliefs, have a stronger
case (other things being equal) to be granted conscientious exemp-
tions. Those who base their conscientious claim on values that are
unjustly intolerant or on utterly irrational beliefs have a much
YOSSI NEHUSHTAN232
weaker case. The content of the conscience should be taken into
account by the courts, along with other relevant considerations, if
the liberal state, through its legislature, already decided to subscribe
to substantive or perfectionist liberalism and to eliminate the avail-
ability of bad options, to discourage people from making bad choices
and to not tolerate illiberal, unjustified intolerance.
Various kinds of moral disagreement (or other types of dis-
agreement) should be tolerated by the state, whereas other kinds of
disagreement should not. In order to distinguish the two, a value-
based examination of the conscience in question must be made.
More specifically, when the states takes a moral-stand when it enacts
its laws, the state should differentiate between two types of cases:
Type 1: claims for exemption or accommodation which are directly based
on repugnant, unjustly intolerant, anti-liberal and ultimately illegitimate
values. This type of cases will be discussed below within the context of
conscientious objection to equality laws.
Type 2: claims which are based on values that may be irrational, intolerant
or morally misguided but are not necessarily morally illegitimate. This
type of cases, which will not be discussed here, includes, for example,
refusal to perform abortion or to provide contraception;4 refusal to wear
safety helmets;5 refusal to work on the religious day of rest;6 refusal to
receive or allow medical treatment (e.g. getting blood transfusion, as is
the case regarding Jehovah Witnesses);7 refusal to compulsory military
service;8 or even refusal to use the internet.9
This distinction can only be maintained if we subscribe to per-
fectionist liberalism and apply content-based considerations – while
rejecting neutral liberalism and giving limited weight to neutral
4 For an ECtHR’s refusal to grant exemption to pharmacists who refused to sell contraception see
Pichon and Sajous v. France Application 49853/99 (2 October 2001). The possible argument that the
refusal to perform abortion in fact relies on anti-liberal, illegitimate values – and therefore falls within
cases of type 1 – will not be discussed here.
5 See generally, Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights (Oxford, 1998), ch. 8.
6 Ruth Gavison and Nahshon Perez, ‘Days of Rest in Multicultural Societies: Private, Public, Se-
parate’ in Theoretical and Historical Context (edited by Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe Robinson;
Cambridge University Press, 2008): pp. 186–213.
7 R v. Blaue [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1411.
8 Bayatyan v. Armenia (2012) 54 EHRR 15.
9 Blackburn & Anor v. Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 525 (TC), (where two beekeepers had won
the right not to file their VAT returns online after claiming that to do so was contrary to their religious
belief).
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considerations. A brief account of these concepts will ground the
conceptual framework of this paper.
Perfectionist theories hold that the state has a duty or at least a
right to promote well-being or human flourishing by supporting and
protecting certain values and ways of life. These theories demand the
state to act – or to refrain from acting – in order to create and
maintain legal and social conditions that best enable their subjects to
pursue valuable and worthwhile lives, rather than any kind of life.10
Any perfectionist political or moral theory holds that some ideals of
human flourishing are sound whereas others are not; that the state is
justified in favouring sound ideals; and that there is no general moral
principle that forbids the state from favouring sound values, as long
as these values are indeed sound. Perfectionist liberalism normally
holds that freedom and autonomy are distinct, sound values,11 and it
defends and promotes the liberal perception of freedom and
autonomy either because continuous autonomy and freedom are
inherently valuable or because they are necessary instruments for
living a valuable and worthwhile life.
Neutral liberalism, as understood for the purpose of this paper,
requires the state to pay equal respect to competing moral claims
and ways of life. It requires that the state should not endorse, pro-
mote or restrict any value or way of life, despite the fact that the
state’s authorities may believe that some values and ways of life are
worth pursuing whereas others are not. According to any perception
of neutral liberalism, when the state decides whether to restrict
people’s freedom – and in our case, the freedom to treat others
differently – it should ignore the moral content of the values on
which the claim for the ‘freedom to discriminate’ is based. The state
can only take into account content-neutral considerations, such as (a)
who will be harmed more – those who discriminate against others if
they are not allowed to discriminate – or those who will be dis-
criminated against if the discrimination against them is allowed; (b)
whether there are alternative service providers; (c) is the service
provider or the service itself public or private; (d) the sincerity of the
values held by the discriminator; (e) whether the service is offered to
the general public; (f) whether the service provider started the
10 Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint, (2007): p. 8.
11 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (1986): p. 19.
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business or joined the workplace before a new ‘no-discrimination’
duty was introduced; etc.
The distinction between perfectionist liberalism and neutral lib-
eralism corresponds, therefore, with the distinction between content-
based and content-neutral considerations (and in this paper – as
pertains to judicial decisions). It has been argued that the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral considerations is
ambiguous; that it has its limitations; that it is incorrectly applied by
the courts; and that it lacks merit.12 Within the context of this paper,
however, this distinction is both plausible and of great importance.
When there is a clash between religious freedom and the principle of
equality, and in a typical case – when a religious person seeks a
permission to discriminate against others because of their sexual
orientation or because of the religious person’s views about gay
people, a perfectionist-liberal would or should compare the relative
weight of (a) the freedom to discriminate against others as a result of
one’s religious belief; and (b) the principle of equality. Within the
narrower context of a refusal to provide a service to gay people (or
to any other customer if the refusal relies on the homophobe’s views
about gay people) the perfectionist-liberal would ask whether acting
on homophobic, religious views should be tolerated in a tolerant-
liberal democracy; Whether acting on these views is so morally
repugnant to the extent that it denies legal protection from those
who act on these views. A neutral-liberal, however, would reject this
line of thought. The way in which neutral-liberalism is understood
for the purpose of this paper prevents the courts from acting on any
meaningful normative judgment (or any normative judgment at all)
with regard to the legitimacy or moral soundness of the values that
ground the behaviour of the homophobic, religious person. The only
relevant considerations would be content-neutral ones, as described
above. These considerations could be used in order to interpret the
12 R. George Wright, ‘Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of
a Common Distinction’ University of Miami Law Review 60(3) (2006): pp. 333–364; Geoffrey Stone,
‘Content Regulation and the First Amendment’ William and Mary Law Review 25(2) (1983): pp. 189–252;
Christopher Schultz, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Content-Based Restrictions on Free Expression: Re-
evaluating the High Versus Low Value Speech Distinction (symposium)’ Arizona Law Review 41 (1999)
573; Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in
the Supreme Court’s Application’ Southern California Law Review 74 (2000): pp. 49–64; Chemerinsky,
‘The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices’ Cleveland State Law
Review 42 (1994): pp. 199–214; Marvin Ammori, ‘Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-
Based Promotion of Democratic Speech’ Federal Communications Law Journals 61 (2009): pp. 273–324.
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law, i.e. to decide whether there was discrimination at all or whether
the discrimination is proportionate and therefore allowed. These
considerations can also be used to decide whether the discriminator
should be exempt from the application of the equality law.
This paper is a specific implementation of a general argument that
will not be defended here, according to which it would be a mistake to
equate liberalism with what is called neutral liberalism – or with non-
interference or not taking a stand. Such a perception of liberalismwould
justify the criticism levelled at liberalism, according towhich liberalism is
the opinion of those who have no opinion, or the behaviour of those
who do not act in accordance with their values.13 Liberalism is first and
foremost a theory that perceives autonomy, freedom and equality (as
understood by liberalism itself) as goods. Since it is a truism that these
goods cannot be protected and promoted by continuous non-interfer-
ence, liberalism in fact requires the state to interfere and at times to
restrict autonomy and freedom in order to secure continuing autonomy
and worthwhile freedom. In order to do so, the state should sometimes
give priority to content-based considerations over content-neutral
considerations when it restricts rights and freedoms.
This paper derives from a substantive-liberal point of view which
is fairly close to Raz’s notion of perfectionist-liberalism. It relies on a
rather radical perception of substantive-liberalism which is, in some
aspects, more far-reaching than Raz’s perfectionist-liberalism. By
saying that I refer mainly to ways of protecting and promoting
autonomy and morality which I may support and Raz may reject.14
More specifically, whereas Raz would argue that government may
use means short of coercion to eliminate the availability of bad
options, including ones that affect one’s autonomy or simply cause
‘moral harm’,15 I would suggest that coercion may be justifiable in
some of these cases, and as long as its aim is to promote or protect
autonomy or other liberal values and principles. I will not try to
justify or elaborate the exact meaning of the perfectionist-liberal
basis of this paper, at least not in a direct, systematic manner. I will
simply argue that holding a radical perfectionist-liberal approach has
13 For a similar view see Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech – and it’s a Good Thing Too
(1994), pp. 134, 138.
14 However, it can also be argued that Raz’s perfectionism is actually more radical than the way in
which Raz himself presents it: RP George, Making Men Moral (1993) ch. 6.
15 Raz pp. 410–419 n [11].
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a few important implications which are relevant to the topic of this
paper – and that within the specific context of equality law – the
suggested perfectionist-liberal approach is the only one that coincides
with the purpose of equality laws in a liberal democracy.
III. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, ILLEGITIMATE VALUES
AND EQUALITY LAWS
A. Introduction
Here I discuss what I called ‘cases of Type 1’, i.e. cases in which the
claim for exemption or accommodation is directly based on unjust,
intolerant, anti-liberal and illegitimate values or practices. Such are,
for example, homophobic or racist views and unjust discriminatory
practices (e.g. a refusal to provide services to gay people; excluding
women from the public or political sphere; discriminatory ‘separate
but equal’ practices and so on). In this section I will focus on cases in
which a claim for exemption or accommodation has being made in
light of an equality law that prohibits discrimination on the ground
of sexual orientation.16 Within this context, as well as within similar
contexts, the argument about the illegitimacy of some views is a
hybrid argument. It is both a normative argument and a descriptive
one. It is normative as it assumes (without trying to justify this point
here) that treating others unfavourably because of their identity
(including sexual identity) is almost always morally repugnant. It is
also a descriptive argument as far as the law, beyond the relevant
equality law, reflects the above moral stand. This is indeed the case
in the UK – and in many other democracies – with regard to sexual
orientation.17 Within this context, four recent cases will be used as
examples: Ashers Baking (refusal to sell a ‘gay marriage’ cake),18 Bull
16 Even though highly relevant to the arguments presented here, I will not discuss the statutory
exemption given to religious groups and organisations which allows them to discriminate on grounds of
sexual orientation in the field of employment.
17 Russell Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ Ecclesiastical Law Journal 13(2) (2011): pp. 158–159,
157.
18 Gareth Lee v. Ashers Baking [2015] NICty 2. The recent Supreme Court decision in this case will not
be addressed here. Suffice it to say that that decision continued to apply the misguided practice of
judicial content-neutral-reasoning. For the Supreme Court decision, see Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd
& Ors (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 49. For criticism of that decision and its reasoning, see Yossi
Nehushtan and Stella Coyle, ‘Ashers Baking (Part 1): The Supreme Court’s Betrayal of Liberalism
and Equality’ UK Constitutional Law Association (5 Nov 2018), https://wp.me/p1cVqo-1BZ; Yossi
Nehushtan and Stella Coyle, ‘Ashers Baking (Part 2): Do Homophobes and Racists have a Right Not to
Manifest Liberal Messages?’ UK Constitutional Law Association (6 Nov 2018), https://wp.me/p1cVqo-
1C2.
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(refusal to let a bed and breakfast room to a gay couple),19 Ladele
(refusal to register a civil partnership between a gay couple),20 and
McFarlane (refusal to counsel same sex couples on sexual matters).21
Notwithstanding important differences between these cases they
all share one crucial point. In all four cases the refusal to provide a
service relied on an adverse judgment that the conscientious objector
made about gay people. In three of the four cases (Bull, Ladele and
McFarlane) a service was denied to gay couples because they were
gay. In the fourth case (Ashers Baking) a service was denied not
because of the identity of the customer but because of his views (i.e.
supporting gay marriage).
In order to prescribe the right response to cases of Type 1 within
the context of equality laws, it is necessary to properly understand
the purpose of equality laws. Specific purposes of equality laws may
vary according to the legislature’s intent – so far as a coherent intent
can be found, the wording of the law – and the legal and social
background. Yet within the commercial context most equality laws
share, either explicitly or implicitly, a similar general purpose (or
purposes).22 In the following I shall explore these purposes and
evaluate their implications with regard to cases of Type 1.
B. The Purpose of Equality Laws: Broad or Narrow Purpose
Within the context of providing services to the general public,
equality laws may have either a broad or a narrow general purpose.
The Ashers Baking case may help in distinguishing between the two.
In Ashers Baking a service was denied not because of the identity of
the customer but because of his views – supporting gay marriage.
This is one of the reasons that makes Ashers Baking a difficult case for
some. The argument here is that Ashers bakery’s owners did not
refuse to serve gay people (a gay person was even employed by the
19 Bull and another v. Hall and another [2013] UKSC 73.
20 Ladele v. London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357.
21 McFarlane v. Relate Avon [2010] EWCA Civ 88.
22 For describing the general purposes of all anti-discrimination laws, see Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory
of Discrimination Law (OUP, Oxford, 2015). In short, Khaitan argues that these purposes are securing
negative freedom; securing access to an adequate range of valuable opportunities; and securing self-
respect. These three goods are necessary, according to Khaitan, for promoting personal well-being
(chapter 4). See also on page 121, where the purpose of discrimination law is described as reducing and
ultimately removing ‘any significant advantage gap between a protected group and its cogent groups’.
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bakery).23 They simply refused to bake a cake that conveyed a
message that contradicted their deeply held values. Their deeply held
values are that gay people are not equal to heterosexuals and as such
should not be allowed to be married. Thus, a service was denied
because the service provider held a negative view about gays as gays.
This is why Ashers Baking is not that different from the other three
cases mentioned above. It is indeed different in the non-important
sense that the bakery’s owners were willing to provide their baking
services to gay people (as opposed to the case in Ladele, Bull and
McFarlane). It is not different in the more important sense that a
service was denied because the service provider believed that gay
couples should not enjoy equal rights – and acted upon this belief
while denying a service.
According to the common view, applying equality or anti-dis-
crimination laws does not require inquiring into the motives or the
reasons for the refusal to provide a certain service – or more gen-
erally, the motives for discrimination.24 This may be true in cases
where the outcome of the refusal is discriminatory, even though
there was no intention to discriminate.25 In such a case the purpose
of the law is to eliminate the discriminatory outcome regardless of
the reasons for the discriminatory behaviour and regardless of
whether there was an intention to discriminate. It would be a mis-
take however to completely ignore the reasons for refusing to pro-
vide a service in all cases. We can think of two possible cases. In the
first, the refusal to provide a service discriminates against customers
on the basis of their protected characteristics. Here, the reasons for
the refusal (i.e. whether the discriminatory act resulted from con-
scious decision, prejudice, antipathy, good faith, etc.) are normally
irrelevant. In the second case, the refusal to provide a service does
not result from the costumer’s protected characteristics. Rather, it
relies on discriminatory values that lead the service provider to make
an adverse judgment about others (non-customers) because of their
protected characteristics. The Ashers Baking case exemplifies this
second case (and here I ignore the unusual case of having ‘political
23 Ashers Baking (n 18) para 18.
24 Bob Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Hart Publishing, 2011): pp. 55–59, 68.
25 For a recent reaffirmation of indirect discrimination as a concept concerned with ‘equality of
results’ rather than ‘equality of treatment’, see Essop & Ors v. Home Office (UK Border Agency) [2017]
UKSC 27.
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opinion’ as protected characteristic). The sellers were willing to
provide their services to both gay and heterosexual customers.
However, they would refuse to provide their services to all cus-
tomers if providing the service supported, directly or indirectly, gay
marriage.
If the relevant equality law prohibits discrimination on the ground
of political (or moral, ideological) opinions, as does Northern Ire-
land’s Equality Act 2006, the relevant law in the Ashers Baking case,
then both possible cases fall within its scope. If not, the
inevitable question at this point would be: what is the purpose of
equality laws – including the Equality Act 2010 – in their application
to service providers? One possible answer would be that the purpose
is to prevent service providers from discriminating against customers
while relying on their protected characteristics, thus to protect cus-
tomers from being discriminated against because of their protected
characteristics. That would be the narrow purpose of the law. This
narrow purpose is expressed in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bull,
where Lady Hale submitted that ‘the purpose was to secure that
people of homosexual orientation were treated equally with people
of heterosexual orientation by those in the business of supplying
goods, facilities and services’.26
A second possible answer would be that the implied purpose of
equality laws is also to prevent service providers from acting upon
their discriminatory views when they provide services to the general
public, thus preventing service providers from refusing to provide a
service if the refusal relies on an adverse judgment about others
(non-customers) because of their protected characteristics. That
would be the broad purpose of the law. This broad purpose was
indirectly applied in Ashers Baking where the County Court in
Northern Ireland decided that discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation may also exist when a service is refused because the
customer ‘is associated with others who are gay’.27 The court also
added that ‘what is required is proof of a factual matrix of less
favourable treatment on the ground of sexual orientation and not the
motive’.28 It is not at all clear whether this approach coincides with
26 Bull para [38] n [19].
27 Ashers Baking para [39] n [18]. It is not quite clear whether ‘discrimination by association’ is the
right way to approach the facts in that case, but I will not discuss this issue here.
28 Ashers Baking para [42] n [18].
YOSSI NEHUSHTAN240
current law; whether current UK law on this issue is sufficiently
clear; and whether this is in fact an application of the ‘broad purpose’
approach. This is, however, a step in the right direction. As will be
argued below, the purpose of equality laws is not merely to prevent
discriminatory acts from harming protected groups. Therefore, it
would be wrong to only prohibit service providers from discrimi-
nating against customers because of the customers’ protected char-
acteristics. Equality laws enforce liberal moral values. They decide
that certain grounds, certain differences between humans, do not
justify different treatment. They prohibit service providers from
acting upon their discriminatory values. Reading equality laws
within this broad context must lead to an acknowledgement of their
broad purpose: to prevent service providers from refusing a service
to the general public if the refusal results from having discriminatory
views about others – and because of these others’ protected char-
acteristics.
It is important to note that even though this broad purpose of
equality laws has never been explicitly adopted by UK courts, the
Equality Act 2010, much like most other equality laws, does not
prevent the court from applying the broad purpose suggested here.
Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 states that ‘A person (A) dis-
criminates against another (B) if, because of a protected character-
istic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others’.
In the context of the facts of the Ashers Baking case, we could say that
the bakery (A) discriminates against the customer (B) if, because of a
protected characteristic (i.e. because of the view that gay people are
not entitled to equal marriage rights), the bakery (A) treats its cus-
tomers who support gay marriage (B) less favourably than they
would treat others (those who do not support gay marriage). There
is nothing in the language of the Equality Act 2010 that prevents this
suggested interpretation.
Within the context of the cases discussed here, one may agree
with the broad purpose of equality laws, and yet to argue that in
these cases (and here Ashers Baking and Ladele are two relevant
examples) the religious service providers did not in fact make any
adverse judgment about gay people – and certainly were not
homophobes. They merely subscribed to a religious perception of
marriage according to which marriage is permissible only between a
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man and a woman. These religious people may support offering the
option of civil partnership to gay couples. They may also see gay
people as equal to heterosexuals in many other ways and support
equal rights to gays in many aspects of our life – but not within the
context of marriage. Accusing these religious people of making ad-
verse judgment about gays or of being homophobes is, according to
this view, misguided.
The answer to this argument is twofold. First, homophobic views,
much like racist and xenophobic views, for example, can be selective
or be held to various extents. One can be homophobic (or racist)
with regard to certain groups or practices or within different con-
texts. Most people are normally not generally or absolutely homo-
phobes or racist. When they are being homophobes or racist, it is
normally within distinct contexts, and it is within these contexts that
they should be identified and treated as what they are. In cases like
Ashers Baking and Ladele, accusing the service providers of being
homophobes or of making adverse judgment about gay people does
not imply that this is who they are in all cases and under all possible
circumstances. It merely accuses them of being homophobes or of
making adverse judgment about gay people within the context of the
right to marriage. Second, the only possible way to interpret the
perception of marriage as an institution that is limited to the rela-
tionship between a man and a women (one man and one women –
or more) – is to see it as an institution that excludes gay couples as a
result of making an adverse judgment about them. There is no other
rationale – whether religious or not – for excluding gay couples from
the institution of marriage, but the view that within this context gay
people are not just different but also inferior and therefore have less
rights than heterosexual couples. No relevant difference that is
morally valid can be found between gays and heterosexuals that can
explain denying gays the right to marriage. No such explanation is
offered by those who object to gay marriage and do not perceive
themselves as homophobes, except for repeating the unexplainable
axiom that marriage, by its nature, is confined to the relationship
between a man and a woman. No explanation is offered as to why
this is – or has to be – the nature of marriage. ‘Because God says so’
is not a morally valid explanation. Tradition is also not a good
enough reason as tradition alone can’t provide moral justification for
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discriminatory practices. The argument that gay marriage (and in-
deed sex) is immoral because it is not ‘of the reproductive kind’ also
does not survive scrutiny because there is no moral, biological or
rational connection between marriage and the ability or will to have
children. Agreeing to grant gay couples equal rights – except for the
right to be called ‘married’ (thus being ‘civil partners’ instead, for
example) is dangerously close, though not completely identical, to
‘separate but equal’ practices. Those who object to gay marriage are
in fact making adverse judgment about gay people because of who
they are – and are therefore homophobes – within the context of the
right to marriage.
This point also clarifies the link between the broad purpose of
equality laws – and perfectionist liberalism. In the examples above,
the question that needs to be answered is whether service providers
should be allowed to act on their homophobic views when they
refuse to provide a service, even when the customer is not gay.
Perfectionist liberalism must perceive homophobic views (or making
adverse judgment about gays because they are gay) as morally
repugnant. Holding these views should be allowed. Expressing them
may be allowed – and that would depend on the circumstances (and
here the perfectionist-liberal may take into account both content-
based considerations, i.e. the morally repugnant content of the
speech, and content-neutral considerations as well). However, acting
on these homophobic views, while providing services, should almost
never be allowed. This is where perfectionist-liberal tolerance ends.
As to neutral liberalism, there is nothing in it that necessarily
prevents service providers from denying a service even when this act
relies on holding homophobic views, and especially when the cus-
tomers themselves are not gay. If Neutral liberalism entails applying
content-neutral considerations only, then the result of a neutral-
liberal approach is not predictable – as it always depends on
changeable circumstances. Neutral liberalism does not require the
state to take a consistent moral stand according to which equality
trumps freedom of religion. In fact, it prevents the state from doing
so. Neutral liberalism, therefore, can’t subscribe to the broad pur-
pose of equality laws as described above. It can’t even fully subscribe
to the narrow purpose, at least not as a matter of principle, because
according to neutral liberalism, direct discrimination may be justified
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under certain and not at all rare circumstances, by applying the
neutral considerations mentioned above.
The argument about the proper reading of equality laws as laws
that prevent service providers from refusing a service to the general
public if the refusal results from having discriminatory views about
others – is complemented by the relation between equality laws and
the harm principle.
C. The Purpose of Equality Laws: The Harm Principle
A common way to decide cases of conscientious objection by relying
on ‘content-neutral’ considerations is to apply the ‘harm principle’ or
to conduct a ‘balance of harms’ in order to avoid the greater harm.29
Applying such a neutral approach within the context of conscientious
objection raises a clear difficulty, to the extent that the crucial cri-
terion for granting exemptions is the amount of harm that may be
caused to the conscientious objector should an exemption not be
granted. The difficulty is that applying such an approach will result in
granting unjustifiable exemptions to intolerant conscientious objec-
tors. The following example can clarify this point.
Assume that the law prohibits discrimination in the workplace on
the ground of race. Also assume that there are just one or two
employers in a major city who refuse to employ non-whites because
of religious conscientious reasons. Finally, we shall assume that,
normally, there is no serious problem of racism in the workplace in
that city (as opposed to many other cities in the same state) and that
non-white people can easily find a job within that city. Applying a
neutral test merely compares the harm that may be caused to racist
conscientious objectors should an exemption not be granted and the
harm that may be caused to potential employees or to the public
interest should an exemption be granted. The result will have to be
the granting of an exemption. This would also be the case if we do
not compare the harm that may be caused to both sides but merely
29 And here I interpret harm in a broad way that may include severe emotional harm, yet still
distinguish it from causing offence or insult to sensitivities or feelings.
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try to avoid inflicting harm on the employee.30 In our case, if the job-
seeker who was discriminated against found or is likely to find an-
other job, a better job, easily and quickly, then apart from being
offended by the racist employer, no meaningful harm was caused
here.31 And if the job-seeker was not offended by the racist em-
ployer, because, for example, the job-seeker is not a person who is
offended easily – or because she does not allow herself to be of-
fended by racists, then in lack of harm or offence, an exemption from
the equality law should be granted to the racist employer. If we wish
to avoid granting exemptions to conscientious objectors who rely on
a racist conscience, or on any other morally illegitimate conscience,
we need to consider the content of the conscience as a reason for not
granting the exemption – even when granting an exemption will not
cause harm to others.
As described above, and within the context of sexual orientation,
the narrow purpose of the Equality Act 2010 is to secure that people
of homosexual orientation are treated equally with people of
heterosexual orientation.32 Even according to this narrow percep-
tion, the purpose is not necessarily to prevent harm or to prevent
violations of other rights (apart from the right to equality). The
purpose is broader than that and covers either preventing offence to
sensitivities – or preventing service providers from acting on dis-
criminatory views, even when no harm or offence is caused.
The circumstances in Bull exemplify this point. In Bull no harm
was caused to the gay couple. The refusal to let them the double
room was not done in a demeaning manner. The gay couple found
alternative accommodation at another hotel. They got their deposit
back and the homophobe, yet kind owners of the B&B even offered
to ‘reimburse the additional expense to which the couple had been
30 C.f. Robert Wintemute, ‘Accommodating Religious Beliefs: Harm, Clothing or Symbols, and
Refusals to Serve Others’ The Modern Law Review 77 (2014): pp. 228–229, 223. (Wintemute argues that
religious objections should be accommodated if no direct or indirect harm is likely to be caused to
others, even though Wintemute defines ‘harm’ in a fairly broad way that also includes, for example, an
insult (241)).
31 And here I reject, without elaborating on this point, the view that ‘dignitary harm’ is in fact harm
rather than offence. In short, perceiving ‘dignitary harm’ as harm blurs the important differences
between the liberal ‘harm principle’ and the liberal ‘offence principle’. For these principles see Joel
Feinberg, ‘Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law’ (1984); Offense to Others: The Moral Limits
of the Criminal Law (1985). Feinberg suggests that the offence principle deals with preventing hurt of
offence (as opposed to injury or harm) to others. For perceiving ‘dignitary harm’ as harm see Jeremy
Waldron, ‘The Harm in Hate Speech’ (Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, Harvard University Press, 2014)
chapter 5.
32 Bull (n 19) para 38.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND EQUALITY LAWS 245
put in having to find alternative accommodation, together with a
modest sum for the inconvenience’.33 The only harm that was
caused here found its expression in the fact that ‘the refusal was very
hurtful to the couple’.34 This is not part of any account of the liberal
‘harm principle’. This is in fact a case of offended sensitivities. This
conclusion is reinforced by the description of the remedy granted by
the court: awarding ‘each of the claimants £1,800 in damages for
injury to feelings’.35
This can lead to two possible conclusions. The first is that the
Equality Act 2010 does not only protect members of vulnerable,
protected groups from being harmed or from being deprived of their
rights (apart from the right to equality). Rather, it also protects them
from being offended by discriminatory acts.36 The second possible
conclusion is that the consequences of the discriminatory act are in
fact irrelevant. Thus, some discriminatory acts are inherently im-
moral and illegal regardless of their actual consequences in each and
every specific case. That would be an implementation of perfec-
tionist liberalism and content-based considerations – and clear
rejection of neutral liberalism and content-neutral considerations:
service providers are not allowed to act upon their discriminatory
views – and the existence of harm or offence in a particular case is
plainly irrelevant. If this conclusion is valid, it brings us back to the
previous question about the purpose of equality laws: if the purpose
of equality laws is broader than preventing harm or offence to – in
our case – customers, and if the purpose is to prevent service pro-
viders from acting upon their discriminatory views when they pro-
vide a service to the general public, then a refusal to provide a
service because the service provider holds discriminatory views
about gay people, for example, is illegal regardless of whether the
customer is or is not gay. Put differently, and according to a proper
reading of the Equality Act 2010 and similar statutes, acting upon an
intolerant, morally illegitimate conscience is illegal because of the
content of the conscience and regardless of the consequences of the
discriminatory act. This assertion also means that equality laws
33 Ibid., para [11].
34 Ibid., para [10].
35 Ibid., para [12].
36 And see section 119(4) of the Equality Act 2010 (c.15): ‘An award of damages may include
compensation for injured feelings…’.
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create hierarchy of rights according to which equality decides the
limits of other human rights. The very existence of equality laws
means that if exercising a right (e.g. freedom of religion) results in an
unjust discriminatory treatment or outcome, equality trumps the
other right. In a liberal, non-religious state, the question of whether
the discriminatory treatment or outcome is in fact unjust must be
decided by subscribing to a liberal perception of equality – and
within the framework of the relevant equality law – thus creating an
inevitable hierarchy of rights.
D. The Purpose of Equality Laws: Hierarchy of Rights
Neutral liberals may respond to this perfectionist-liberal perception
of equality laws – or equality generally – by arguing that the content-
based approach to the issue of conscientious or moral objection
reflects ‘monoculturalism’, which denies the right to hold moral
positions on certain issues that differ from the majority acceptance of
them. Parkinson, for example, uses this argument in order to support
the granting of an exemption from equality laws to those who refuse
to take part in the registration of same-sex marriage or partnership –
or in conducting these ceremonies.37 Since those who refuse to take
part in the registration of same-sex marriage or partnership are no
different from those who refuse to sell a ‘gay marriage’ cake (as all
refuse to provide a service because of the adverse judgment they
make about gays) – the following applies to the Ashers Baking case as
well.
Parkinson accuses perfectionist-liberals of ‘monoculturalism’
within the context of equality laws. However, it seems a bit odd to
criticise equality laws for denying the right to act upon certain moral
positions – as this is the exact purpose of most equality laws. It is, in
fact, their nature. When equality laws include protected character-
istics (in our case – sexual orientation) they take a moral view on this
issue, which almost always contradicts other moral views that some
people hold. The prohibition on discriminating against others on the
basis of their sexual orientation is not aimed at enlightened people
who would never consider discriminating against lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, nor is it mainly aimed at
37 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Accommodating Religious Beliefs in a Secular Age: The Issue of Conscientious
Objection in the Workplace’ University of New South Wales Law Journal 34(1) (2011): pp. 281–299, 294.
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those who discriminate against LGBTs because of mere preferences
or interests. It is aimed at homophobes and those who have moral
reasons for discriminating against LGBTs. From the tolerant-liberal
state’s point of view, it makes no sense to exempt from equality laws
the same people who are the reason for enacting such laws. It ap-
pears that the argument against ‘monoculturalism’ is in fact an
argument against core liberal values and, perhaps not deliberately,
against certain aspects of equality laws as such.
Parkinson applies pure neutral reasoning when he argues that
those who refuse to obey equality laws within the context of pro-
viding services should be exempt from the law when their refusal to
perform a service ‘forms a very small part of the workload of the
organisation and where those services could readily have been per-
formed by many others’.38 A similar view was expressed by Vickers
who asked, following Ladele, if it was ‘really necessary to designate
all registrars as civil partnership registrars (as opposed to the clear
need for all designated registrars to carry out civil partnership reg-
istrations)?’.39 This approach was in fact applied by some local
authorities in the UK, allowing registrars with a sincerely held reli-
gious objection to the formation of civil partnerships between gay
couples to opt out of designation as civil partnership registrars.40
This approach, if taken seriously, can easily justify granting an
exemption to those who refuse to register marriages or partnerships
– or to provide any service of any kind (educational, medical,
financial, etc.) on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation etc., as
long as the discriminated group is a very small minority (generally –
or within the group of potential customers) – thus requiring services
that form a very small part of the workload of the organisation – and
as long as the service can be provided by others.
The liberal state should not hurry to compromise its liberal values
– when they are expressed in value-based legislation – by applying
neutral tests and granting exemptions to those who do not share
these values. Such compromises will make the law – and core liberal
values – redundant. It should be easier for the liberal state to apply
neutral tests when it considers granting exemptions to those who,
38 Parkinson (n 37) 294.
39 Lucy Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ Ecclesiastical
Law Journal 12(3) (2010): pp. 280–303, 294.
40 Eweida v. United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 213, para 25.
YOSSI NEHUSHTAN248
for conscientious reasons, object to laws that do not reflect liberal
values (e.g. safety laws that impose a duty to wear helmets) or to
those who object to laws that contradict their conscience, yet their
conscience does not reflect intolerant and anti-liberal values (e.g. an
objection to performing abortions – and here I assume that per-
ceiving the foetus as a person is not necessarily intolerant or illib-
eral). The liberal state does not have to grant exemptions in cases
that fall within these categories, as further considerations should also
be taken into account, but the fact that granting exemptions in these
cases does not run against core liberal values is a reason not to refuse
granting exemptions.
Equality laws, however, do not fall in either of these categories.
As was rightly stated by Lord Sedley in Ladele, ‘to have accommo-
dated the requests of those Registrars seeking to avoid the con-
ducting of civil partnerships would have resulted in (at least partially)
segregated services. This is because such would necessarily result in
opposite sex couples being serviced by certain Registrars and same
sex couples by others’.41
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), while upholding
the UK courts’ rulings in Ladele and McFarlane, held that ‘differences
in treatment based on sexual orientation require particularly serious
reasons by way of justification’.42 The court avoided in-depth legal
analysis of these cases and openly relied on the margin of appreci-
ation doctrine, thus allowing UK courts wide discretion when they
balance between competing Convention rights.43 Yet, the above
statement does reveal a content-based, liberal view according to
which the principle of equality often decides the limits of freedom of
religion rather than the other way around.
There are only two options here: either freedom of religion al-
lows religious believers to discriminate against others – or equality
defines the limits of freedom of religion. Between these two options,
the second must be preferred, and for three reasons.44 First, equality,
freedom and autonomy are the basis of all other human rights.
41 Ladele (n 20) para 55.
42 Eweida (n 40) para 105.
43 Eweida (n 40) para 106, 109.
44 For the view that the Equality Act 2010 does create a hierarchy of rights – or that courts apply the
Equality Act 2010 in a way that creates a hierarchy of rights, see Stephen Hunt, ‘Negotiating Equality in
the Equality Act 2010 (United Kingdom): Church-State Relations in a Post-Christian Society’ Journal of
Church and State 55(4) (2012): pp. 690–711; Vickers (n 39); Sandberg (n 17) 180.
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Humans have rights as humans – and they are all equally human.
They have rights so they could be free to be the (partial) authors of
their life without fear of sanctions, being manipulated or threatened,
and thus to be autonomous. Therefore the limits or the scope of all
human rights, including freedom of religion, are defined inter alia by
equality and freedom itself. More specifically, freedom of religion
ends when it leads to an unjust discrimination against others.45 The
question of whether exercising freedom of religion unjustly dis-
criminates against others cannot be answered without subscribing to
a comprehensive moral or political theory. It cannot be answered by
subscribing only to neutral liberalism. It can only be answered by
subscribing to either the religious point of view or to the liberal-
humanist-secular point of view. If the relevant equality legislation
entrenches liberal-humanist-secular values it will be inconsistent if it
does not create a hierarchy of rights according to which equality sets
the limits of freedom of religion. One may argue that if equality and
freedom set the limits of human rights, this may result in an asser-
tion according to which rights of others end when they unjustly
violate freedom of religion. Here, again, the question of whether
freedom of religion is unjustly violated cannot be answered in a
satisfactory way by applying only neutral tests. This question cannot
be answered without subscribing to a comprehensive moral or
political theory, and here, yet again, one must choose between the
religious point of view and the liberal-humanist-secular point of
view. If the state and the legal system generally subscribe to a liberal
point of view, prioritising religion would be possible, but inconsis-
tent.
Second, equality must decide the limit of freedom of religion –
rather than the other way around, if the state already enacted an
equality law – and because of the purpose of all equality laws.
Enacting equality laws – and then deciding that freedom of religion
decides the limits of equality, will render equality laws almost
meaningless. This is so because in many liberal democracies, reli-
gious belief or conscience is one of the main motives for discrimi-
nating against certain groups – and in some cases – the dominant
motive. There is, therefore, little point in enacting equality laws and
then to significantly frustrate their purpose by subjecting equality to
45 For a similar view, see Frances Raday, ’Culture, Religion and Gender’ International Journal of
Constitutional Law 1(4) (2003): pp. 663–715, 701.
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freedom of religion. The opposite, however, is not true. Subjecting
freedom of religion to equality does not render freedom of religion
meaningless. It normally does not prevent religious believers from
continuing to practice their religion or act upon its values in
numerous meaningful ways. And if prohibiting religious believers
from unjustly discriminating against others does prevent religious
believers from practicing their religion or acting upon its values in a
way that significantly diminishes their overall freedom of religion,
that would probably mean that from a liberal point of view, that
specific religion does not prescribe a valuable way of life that is
worthy of extensive legal protection. If a certain religion, or any set
of beliefs, cannot be followed in a meaningful way without signifi-
cantly compromising the purposes of equality legislation, and if the
liberal state takes equality seriously, then that religion will either
have to adjust to core liberal values – or to not enjoy the protection
of the law.
Thirdly, equality must define the limits of freedom of religion
rather than the other way around, because if religious beliefs trump
equality, and if religious beliefs should be accorded a similar weight
to any other moral belief (and maybe also philosophical or political
beliefs) – and in liberal democracies that is exactly the case – then all
moral beliefs would also trump equality norms and that, of course,
will render equality legislation almost completely meaningless.
An interesting attempt to avoid the conclusion that within a
hierarchy of rights the principle of equality trumps freedom of reli-
gion was suggested by Pitt who argues that when the courts decide
that equality marks the limits of freedom of religion in cases of direct
discrimination, the courts do not in fact create a hierarchy of rights.
Instead, Pitt argues that ‘insofar as there is a clash of rights, it is
resolved simply by the application of the usual principles of direct
and indirect discrimination, not by preferring one protected char-
acteristic to another’.46 Therefore, preventing a religious person
from directly discriminating against others is an indirect discrimi-
nation against that religious person. And here, Pitt argues, ‘the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect discrimination gives effect to the
underlying moral principle that less favourable treatment just be-
46 Gwyneth Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ Industrial Law Journal 42(4) (2013): pp. 398–408, 408
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cause of a protected characteristic is basically indefensible’,47 whereas
rules imposed for neutral reasons that have an adverse impact on
people with a particular protected characteristic are capable of jus-
tification. Even according to this approach equality laws set an
underlying moral principle according to which less favourable
treatment just because of a protected characteristic is basically
indefensible. This is indeed a moral principle that is morally con-
tested by many, especially non-liberals. This moral-liberal principle
does create a hierarchy of rights after all as it prefers the principle of
equality to freedom of conscience and religion – or uses the principle
of equality to decide the limits of freedom of conscience and religion.
Acknowledging that a hierarchy of rights is inevitable when we
apply equality legislation (without rendering it almost meaningless)
would be another reason for rejecting neutral approaches when
courts decide whether to exempt conscientious objectors from the
application of equality laws. In Ashers Baking the court ruled that
‘where businesses are open to the public on a commercial basis, then
they have to accept the public as it is constituted’.48 In the Appeal the
court ruled, along a similar line, that ‘in the present case the
appellants might elect not to provide a service that involves any
religious or political message. What they may not do is provide a
service that only reflects their own political or religious belief…’.49
These rulings reflect a neutral reasoning that completely ignores the
values of both the service provider and the customer. If courts follow
this reasoning they will have to rule that a gay-friendly bakery,
owned by gay activists, and that employ gay workers, has to provide
customers cakes with icing that says, for example, ‘homosexuality is
a sin’. In many aspects, the statement ‘homosexuality is a sin’ is not
different from ‘support gay marriage’. Both statements are legal;
both contradict deeply held beliefs of others; and both reflect deeply
held beliefs – religious or others. And yet, treating these statements
or cases the same will run against core liberal values – and the
purpose of equality legislation. Within the commercial context, the
purpose of equality laws is or should be to prevent service providers
from acting upon their discriminatory values. Forcing homophobe
service providers to act against their discriminatory values – or
47 Pitt (n 46) 408.
48 Ashers Baking (n 18) para 32.
49 Gareth Lee v. MacArthur [2016] NICA 39, para 100.
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preventing them from acting upon these values, coincides with
perfectionist liberalism and the purpose of equality laws. Forcing gay
service providers to enable customers to act upon their discrimina-
tory values or to convey their discriminatory values (e.g. by printing
discriminatory messages for them) runs against perfectionist liber-
alism and the purpose of equality laws. If equality defines the limits
of freedom of religion – or freedom of expression (including the right
not to manifest views to which one objects), then service providers
should not be forced to assist a customer to convey a certain mes-
sage only if (a) the message contradicts the service provider’s deeply
held belief, or diminishes important aspects of the service provider’s
identity or way of life; and (b) the refusal to convey the message does
not rely on discriminatory, unjustly intolerant or morally repugnant
values – or results from such values. Genuine liberalism does not
countenance an ‘either/or’ here; the former condition only has
meaning within a liberal framework if the latter condition is also
met.
Within the framework of perfectionist liberalism and equality
laws, this is where the difference between the above two statements
lies. ‘Support gay marriage’ does contradict deeply held beliefs of
some religious people but it does not convey discriminatory values
and does not result from such values. It does not perceive religious
people as less worthy as humans or right-holders because of who
they are. It does not contradict core values of liberalism – the same
values that stand at the heart of all meaningful equality laws. The
refusal to convey the message does rely on discriminatory, unjustly
intolerant and morally repugnant values and therefore should not be
protected by the law. ‘Homosexuality is a sin’, however, does not
just contradict deeply held beliefs of some people. It conveys dis-
criminatory values and results from such values. These are the same
values that equality laws themselves perceives as illegitimate. It
perceives gay people as less worthy as human-beings or right-holders
because of who they are. Forcing service providers to actively enable
conveying these views or to assist in conveying them – while relying
on equality or anti-discrimination legislation – is self-contradictory.
Having hierarchy of rights means that at least within the context of
equality laws (a) religious belief cannot justify treating others less
favourably; and (b) religious belief – as far as it is conveyed by
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expressing discriminatory views – may, under certain and excep-
tional circumstances (that were described above), form a reason to
treat the one who holds that belief less favourably, for example by
denying a service.
E. The Orwellian Argument: Equality Laws as Discriminatory Laws
A common argument made either explicitly or implicitly by many is
that the court should at least appreciate that those who are pre-
vented from discriminating against others, even though their con-
science or religion prescribes such discrimination, are or may be the
ones who are being discriminated against.50 That was in fact the
argument presented by the Attorney General in Ashers Baking before
the Court of Appeal. The Attorney General argued that requiring the
bakery’s owners to produce a political message with theological
content to which they objected on the grounds of their own religious
belief (and political opinion) ‘constituted less favourable treatment of
them in comparison with the persons sharing the political and reli-
gious views expressed in the message.’51
Two different tests can be applied here in order to refute this
argument. The first is the intention/motive test, which is a neutral
one. This test asks who was the first who restricted (in the broadest
sense possible) the freedom of others – or discriminated against
others – because of a negative opinion about these others or their
values. The second is a content-based test that gives priority to
liberal values over non-liberal ones.
If we apply the intention/motive test to the Ashers Baking case, we
will find that the buyer did not aim to discriminate against religious-
Christian cake sellers because of their religion or religious belief. He
did not treat them differently because of their religious belief or
indeed at all. His initial purpose was not to limit their freedom of
religion because he made an adverse judgment about their identity
or their values. The sellers, however, did exactly that. They refused
to serve a customer because of the adverse judgment they made
50 For this argument, see Julie Maher, ‘Eweida and Others: A New Era for Article 9?’ International &
Comparative Law Quarterly (2014): pp. 231–232, 213; Russell Sandberg, ‘Laws and Religion: Unravelling
McFarlane v. Relate Avon Limited’ Ecclesiastical Law Journal 12(3) (2010): pp. 361–370, 363; Julie Rivers,
‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ Ecclesiastical Law Journal 14(3) (2012): pp. 371–399, 383.
51 Ashers Baking 2016 (n 49) para 91.
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about gay people as such – and as a result – about the customer’s
views.
Ignoring the intention/motive test may lead to Orwellian asser-
tions. The ‘pro-religious’, ‘anti-gay’ joint dissenting opinion of judges
Vucinic and De Gaetano in the Eweida case exemplifies this point.
The ECtHR judges argued that Ladele, who refused to register civil
partnerships between gay couples, was in fact the one who was
discriminated against. This was so because ‘given the cogency,
seriousness, cohesion and importance of her conscientious objection
… it was incumbent upon the local authority to treat her differently
from those registrars who had no conscientious objection to offici-
ating at same-sex unions’.52 Ignoring the intention/motive test al-
lowed the judges to argue that those who discriminate against others
are in fact being discriminated against precisely because the law
prohibits them to discriminate against others. Thus, anti-discrimi-
nation laws in fact discriminate against those whose conscience
compels them to discriminate against others. George Orwell must be
laughing in his grave.
The intention/motive test cannot be a sufficient or conclusive
one, precisely because of its neutral nature. It has to be comple-
mented by a content-based test that gives priority to liberal values
over non-liberal ones. Northern Ireland’s Equality Act 2006, for
example, in the light of which the Ashers Baking case was decided,
best explains the need for this complement. The Act prohibits dis-
crimination on the ground of political opinion. Let us assume, again,
that a bakery is owned by a group of gay activists and is known as a
‘gay-friendly’ bakery. A customer orders a cake with the print ‘say no
to same-sex marriage’ or ‘homosexuality is a sin’. Both expressions
are legal, thus according to the court’s reasoning in the Ashers Baking
case (the Court of Appeal), the sellers will have to bake and sell such
a cake.53 Therefore, a ‘gay-owned/friendly bakery’ will have to
indirectly support anti-gay and homophobic statements in the same
way a Christian-owned bakery has to sell a pro-same-sex marriage
cake.
52 Eweida (n 40) dissenting para 7. See also, Ryan Hill, ‘Non-discrimination on Grounds of Sexual
Orientation: Should the Law Accord Exemptions on the Basis of Freedom of Conscience?’ Questions of
International Law 7 (2014): pp. 13–26, 19: (‘failing to allow a religious person to follow the dictates of
their {discriminatory} conscience may in itself be discriminatory’).
53 For the ‘legality of the expression’ test, see Ashers Baking (n 18) para 62.
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This symmetry between pro-gay and anti-gay statements is mo-
rally wrong. It results from not taking a moral stand for or against
anti-gay expressions and homophobic views. The symmetry is wrong
because there is nothing in homosexuality as such – or in the de-
mand for equal rights to gay people – that intends to deny the
legitimacy of others, to condemn their way of life or to exclude it
legally, socially, culturally or physically. Homosexuality, as such,
does not entail making adverse judgments about others. However,
the very essence of religious or conservative homophobia, when it is
expressed openly or being used as reasons for action, is making an
adverse judgment about homosexuals as such, condemning homo-
sexuality as immoral or excluding it legally, culturally or even
physically. A liberal state that refuses to take a moral stand against
homophobia ceases to be a liberal state. It will only be a neutral
state, denying its duty to protect people from acts that are com-
mitted on the ground of seeing other human beings as less worthy.
This is not to say that all private employers who have deeply held
moral values should be allowed to discriminate against those who
think differently. This will only be the case when the employer or
the service provider deeply holds liberal values – that the law itself
entrenches – and when the employee or job-seeker holds anti-liberal,
intolerant and morally repugnant values, or when a client or a buyer
asks for a service that compels the service provider to identify with
these repugnant values or to help promoting them. Presumably, this
will only rarely be the case, but as the Ashers Baking case demon-
strates, rare cases are only rare, not hypothetical.
The neutral intention/motive test according to which we ask
who was the first who treated others differently merely shifts the
burden of proof. It is for those who were the first to discriminate
against others to justify their acts. Such justification may be found if
the discriminator acts upon liberal values – and as a reaction to an
act or a demand which is based on anti-liberal, morally repugnant
values.
The purpose of equality acts is to prevent discrimination based on
protected grounds. Confusingly, one of these protected grounds is
religion. This is confusing because religious belief is quite often the
reason for a discriminatory approach against others. Moreover,
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religious belief is presumably the only protected ground that can
itself be a reason for discriminating against others.54
But religious belief is merely a belief. Unless it is argued that
religious belief should be singled out for special, positive treatment –
and that would be incompatible with any meaningful version of
liberalism and with the principle of equality itself – equality laws
should be interpreted in the following way: discriminating against
religious people only because they are religious, while completely
ignoring the content of their religious belief or the general content of
their religion – is morally wrong and also illegal. At the same time,
religious belief should almost never form a legal reason for dis-
criminating against others unless we are willing to allow all those
who are morally committed to discriminatory views to act upon
these views and to discriminate against others. And that would
obviously be a death sentence for all equality laws. This explains why
arguing that preventing people from discriminating against others,
even though their conscience or religion prescribes such discrimi-
nating, is in fact discrimination – is an Orwellian argument. Such an
argument empties equality laws of their content and purpose and
leads to a legal permission to discriminate merely because one
deeply holds discriminatory values.
The Court of Appeal in Ashers Baking, that applied a neutral ap-
proach throughout its ruling, indicated that ‘it would be ironic if the
constitutional protections against legislative or executive discrimi-
nation based on religious belief or political opinion… were to be-
come the instruments for the support of differential treatment of
fellow citizens based on religious belief and political opinion’.55 The
reluctance to accept the Orwellian argument is just, yet accepting the
Orwellian argument will be a bit more than ironic. It would be
paradoxical – and in terms of achieving the purpose of equality
legislation – self-defeating.
Another pro-religion Orwellian argument is that in recent UK
case-law the courts created a ‘hierarchy of equalities’ in which reli-
gious equality takes a subordinate position. Using the term ‘religious
equality’ to describe the religious person’s alleged right not be dis-
criminated against when they discriminate against others is Orwel-
54 Aileen McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart Publishing, 2014): p. 136.
55 Ashers Baking 2016 (n 49) para 101.
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lian and misleading. ‘Religious equality’ cannot include the right to
discriminate against others. As argued above, all that ‘religious
equality’ can include in a tolerant-liberal democracy that does not
favour racist, homophobic or sexist religious beliefs over identical
beliefs that are non-religious, is the right not to be discriminated
against merely because one is religious (regardless of the content of
one’s religious beliefs – or the content of one’s religion). It does not
follow that religion should be treated in like fashion to ethnicity or
sexual orientation for the purposes of equality laws.56 It does mean
that ‘religion’ should be distinguished from ‘religious belief’ for the
purposes of equality laws, as the former is closer to one’s identity or
status than the latter. This distinction between identity and belief is
important – and the subject of the next section.
F. Discrimination on the Ground of Identity and Discrimination
on the Ground of Belief57
Earlier I argued that the purpose of equality laws is to prevent
service providers from acting upon their discriminatory views when
they provide services to the general public, thus preventing service
providers from refusing to provide a service if the refusal relies on an
adverse judgment about others (non-customers) because of their
protected characteristics. I argued that this is the broad purpose of
equality laws – including the Equality Act 2010.
The broad purpose of the law may be rejected by anti-liberals and
neutral liberals alike. A ‘pluralist’, ‘multi-culturalist’, neutral position
led some liberals to protect the right of the sellers in Ashers Baking to
refuse to sell a ‘gay marriage’ cake. Their reasoning, within the
special context of Ashers Baking, goes as follows: service providers
should be allowed to act upon their values and thus to refuse to
provide their services as long as the refusal does not rely on the
customer’s protected characteristics but on the customer’s views.58
This is so even when the customer’s views, or more accurately the
message that the customer wishes to convey, are within the
boundaries of the law. This is a neutral position as it allows all
56 As was rightly suggested by McColgan (n 54) 169, 171.
57 The concepts ‘identity’ and ‘belief’ are complex and the relation between identity and belief raises
complex questions. I will refrain from discussing these concepts and questions here.
58 This view was taken by the UK Supreme Court in Ashers Baking: (n 18) paragraph 52.
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service providers to refuse to provide their services on that ground
and regardless of the moral soundness or legitimacy of their own
values.
Therefore, and to take a few examples which were suggested by
Spenser, a Catholic bakery should be allowed to refuse to sell a cake
with a pro-abortion icing; a Muslim-owned bakery should be allowed
to refuse to sell a cake proclaiming ‘Jesus is our Lord’; a secular
owned bakery should be allowed to refuse to sell a cake calling for
Sharia law; and a Christian-owned bakery should be allowed to re-
fuse to sell a ‘gay marriage’ cake.59 These examples are misleading
because there is a crucial difference between the first three examples
and the Ashers Baking case. Opposing abortions, Christianity or
Sharia law may or may not be morally sound but it should be
tolerated by equality laws – and the law generally. A refusal to
support, directly or indirectly, a world view that contradicts one’s
deepest moral beliefs should normally be tolerated by the law.
However, opposing gay marriage is not quite the same as opposing
abortions, Christianity or Sharia law. The latter three are about
views, ideologies and beliefs. Opposing other people’s views should
be tolerated or respected – and in any event allowed. The former,
however, (opposing gay marriage) is about people’s identity. It is
about perceiving other people as non-equal because of who they are.
People may hold these views but acting upon such views should
normally not be allowed.
Therefore, it is misleading to compare the Ashers Baking case to
cases where service providers refuse to support views of any kind
that contradict their deepest moral beliefs. The right comparison in
this case is a refusal to sell a cake calling for or supporting inter-racial
marriage. If a racist-white-owned bakery refuses to sell a cake to a
white customer because the cake calls for inter-racial marriage, how
would neutral liberals react? If they prohibit such a refusal they will
have to substitute their neutrality with a more desirable, perfec-
tionist version of liberalism. They will actually have to take a moral
stand against certain values because of their content. If, however,
they allow such a refusal, it will demonstrate the moral shortfall of
neutral liberalism.
59 Nick Spenser, ‘Storm in a Gay Cake Tin’, Think Tank (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.theosthinktank.
co.uk/comment/2016/02/03/storm-in-a-gay-cake-tin#sthash.GBg40dBK.dpuf (accessed 3rd February
2016).
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If a racist-white-owned bakery refuses to sell a cake to a white
customer because the cake calls for inter-racial marriage, what would
be the legal response according to the Equality Act 2010, which does
not prohibit discrimination on the ground of political opinions? The
only possible way to compel the bakery to sell such a cake would be
to adopt the broad purpose of equality laws, which is to prevent
service providers from acting upon their discriminatory views when
they provide services to the general public, regardless of the identity
of the customer.
The comparison to racial discrimination is not coincidental. In
Ladele Lord Sedley rightly suggested that exempting homophobic
registrars from equality laws, thus allowing them not to provide
services to same-sex couples would be as repugnant as racial segre-
gation that is now almost unanimously perceived as morally ille-
gitimate.60
Northern Ireland’s Equality Act 2006 (because it includes ‘political
opinion’ as a ground of discrimination), the Equality Act 2010 (be-
cause it includes religious belief as a ground of discrimination) and
also Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) raise a broad issue, which will not be discussed in full here,
pertaining to the difference between identity and ideology or belief.
Discriminating against persons – or not tolerating persons merely
because of their identity (e.g. their race, colour, ethnic origins, sexual
orientation, etc.) is almost always morally wrong. However, dis-
criminating against persons – or not tolerating persons because of
their views, ideologies or beliefs – including religious ones – may be
morally wrong but the presumption of immorality that is followed
by a presumption of illegality is much weaker here.61 This has
nothing to do with the question of which grounds may or may not
be relevant to a person’s ability to undertake work,62 nor with the
ability to choose, as neither identity nor deeply held moral beliefs are
chosen (and I do not intend to elaborate on this point here).63 The
60 Ladele (n 20) para 48.
61 For a discussion in the still underdeveloped question of whether one has a right to discriminate
against others because of their non-religious beliefs, see McColgan (n 54) 159–165.
62 C.f. Mark Bell and Lisa Waddington, ‘Reflecting on Inequalities in European Equality Law’
European Law Review 28(3) (2003): pp. 349–369.
63 For the ‘lack of choice’ argument with relation to moral and conscientious beliefs, see Yossi
Nehushtan and John Danaher, ‘The Foundations of Conscientious Objection: Against Freedom and
Autonomy’ Jurisprudence 9(3) (2018): pp. 541–565.
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distinction between people’s identity and people’s views lies else-
where.
All humans are equal as humans. As such, they should be treated
equally (subject to rare exceptions) regardless of their identity i.e.
regardless of their human characteristics (their race, colour, ethnic
origins, sexual orientation, etc.) or, perhaps, status.64 While all hu-
mans are worthy of equal respect as humans, at least as a starting
point, not all views, ideologies or beliefs – including religious ones –
are worthy of equal respect. Some views are morally sound and
worthy of respect. Others are misguided yet should still be tolerated
– and may also not form a valid reason for different treatment (at
least under certain circumstances or within certain contexts). But
there are views that are morally illegitimate and as such should not
be tolerated in a liberal democracy. These views would normally
form a valid reason for a proportionate different treatment. Dis-
criminatory views, those that entail adverse judgments about others
because of who they are, are an example of such views.
The distinction between identity and views, including religious
views, is reinforced by the link between equality and dignity. Human
dignity is the foundation of most human rights and certainly one of
the most fundamental foundations of the principle of equality.65
‘Human dignity’ may have various meanings. According to the
common perception of the concept, discrimination on the ground of
a person’s identity is more likely to harm their dignity and at times to
humiliate them than discrimination on the ground of their views.66
It is a truism that respecting or merely tolerating all political,
ideological, conscientious and religious views is practically impossi-
ble and in any event undesirable. Such moral relativism is not, has
not and cannot be applied by any state. Respecting all humans as
humans, however, is certainly possible and, subject to rare excep-
tions, desirable.
Sexual orientation is part of one’s identity rather than one’s views
or beliefs. As such, it is no different from one’s race or ethnic origins
(and I do not imply that there are no other differences between
sexual identity, race and ethnic origins). All form part of a person’s
64 McColgan (n 54) 60–63.
65 McColgan (n 54) 23–32; Hepple (n 24) 14–16.
66 McColgan (n 54) 170. In lack of a better word I use the term ‘harm’ with regard to dignity, even
though this ‘harm’ falls outside the scope of the liberal ‘harm principle’.
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identity, all are in-born characteristics and all are often grounds for
discrimination and persecution.67 Nowadays not tolerating racial
discrimination is part of a very wide consensus. It is indeed safe to
assume that the ECtHR would not be willing to accept an argument
that Article 9 protects a racist religion or a manifestation of such a
religion.68 But on what grounds can we differentiate between racism
and homophobia within the context of equality laws?
Many who would object to religious racism preach for tolerating
religious homophobia. Rex Ahdar, for example, argues that as a
starting point ‘no-one ought to be forced to marry a couple against
that person’s religious beliefs or conscience’.69 This starting point is
far from being obvious as most conscientious reasons for refusing to
marry a couple rely on suspect classifications such as sexual identity
and race. More importantly, Ahdar then refers to Bruce MacDou-
gall’s criticism on the common legal or social practice of accom-
modating objections to conducting same-sex marriage ceremonies.
MacDougall’s argues that ‘to only allow refusals to conduct SSM
[same-sex marriage] (and not refusals to marry, say, opposite-race or
divorced couples) demonstrates that the state is not trying to
accommodate religious consciences in general but rather it is ‘‘sim-
ply supportive of religious hostility to homosexuals, ie, homopho-
bia’’.’70 Ahdar’s response is that this criticism is misplaced because
‘the granting of an exemption for devout commissioners does not
demonstrate that the state necessarily accepts the views of those
commissioners’.71 It is true that exempting either religious officials or
state’s officials from equality laws – and only with regard to same-sex
marriage – does not imply that the state itself holds or positively
67 For a persuasive argument that the state should not grant tax benefits to institutions that dis-
criminate on the basis of sex (rather than just on the basis of race) even if the discriminatory practice is
based on religious grounds, see Caroline Corbin, ‘Expanding the Bob Jones Compromise’ in Austin Sarat
(ed.), Legal Responses to Religious Practices in the United States: Accommodation and its Limits (2012) 123. For
a similar view regarding the denial of state funds to institutions that discriminate, see another article
from the above collection: Corey Brettschneider, ‘How Should Liberal Democracies Respond to Faith
Based Groups that Advocate Discrimination? State Funding and Non-Profit Status’, ibid. 72. There is no
principled argument preventing expanding these views to discrimination on the basis of sexual identity.
68 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion, Equality, and the British
Constitution: The JFS Case Considered’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 9(1) (2011): pp. 200–
229, 224.
69 Rex Ahdar, ‘Solemnisation of Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom’ Ecclesiastical Law Journal
6(3) (2014): pp. 283–305.
70 Bruce MacDougall, ‘Refusing to Officiate at Same-Sex Civil Marriages’, Saskatchewan Law Review
69 (2006): pp. 351–374, 358.
71 Ahdar (n 69) 296.
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promotes homophobia. But Ahdar is too quick to dismiss the race –
sexual orientation comparison, because when the state allows re-
fusals to conduct same-sex marriage but not refusals to conduct
interracial marriage, the state expresses a moral view according to
which racism should not be tolerated, even when it is based on
conscientious-religious reasons, whereas homophobia should. This is
a powerful statement. Even if it should not be interpreted as direct
state support of religious homophobia it certainly classifies homo-
phobia as tolerable, at least to a certain extent. It also classifies
homophobia as acceptable, certainly from the legal point view.
The liberal state – if it is indeed liberal – should not be sluggish
when it walks the path of treating homophobia as it treats racism. A
reluctance to tolerate homophobic claims for exemptions from
equality laws would be a good start.
IV. TWO CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions that can be drawn from the above are of two kinds:
general ones and more specific ones. The general conclusions relate
to equality laws within the context of providing services to the
general public – and to equality laws more generally. The more
specific conclusions relate to the case of discriminating against gay
people – within the context of providing services to the general
public.
I argued that if accommodating conscientious objections is almost
always an expression of tolerance, then deciding whether to
accommodate conscientious objections means deciding the limits of
tolerance. By enacting equality laws the liberal state decides the
limits of liberal tolerance by relying on content-based rather than
content-neutral considerations. More specifically, equality laws’
broad purpose, within the context of providing services, should be
read as preventing service providers from acting upon their dis-
criminatory views when they provide services to the general public,
thus preventing service providers from refusing to provide a service
if the refusal relies on an adverse judgment about either customers
or non-customers because of their protected characteristics.
Equality laws do not only reflect the liberal harm principle or the
offence principle. Their purpose is not only to prevent inflicting
harm or offence but also to prevent service providers from acting
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upon their discriminatory views, regardless of the existence of harm
or offence in a particular case. Equality laws also create a clear
hierarchy of rights according to which equality decides the limits of
freedom of religion. Finally, equality laws and their judicial appli-
cation should – and to a certain extent do – perceive discrimination
on the basis of a person’s identity as more suspicious than discrim-
ination on the basis of a person’s belief, including religious belief.
Equality laws therefore are not and cannot be neutral. They re-
flect a content-based moral decision about the importance and
weight of the principle of equality vis-à-vis other rights or interests.
This leads to the following conclusions.
First, since equality laws in liberal democracies reflect moral-
liberal values, conscientious objections to equality laws rely, almost
by definition, on unjustly intolerant, anti-liberal and morally repug-
nant values. If the liberal state takes its liberal and morally desirable
equality laws seriously, it should not rush to compromise its liberal
values by exempting conscientious objectors from the application of
these laws.
Secondly, since equality laws in liberal democracies reflect a
moral-liberal point of view, we should not shy away from explicitly
relying on these views when we decide if it is justifiable to exempt
conscientious objectors from the application of these laws. Accord-
ingly, we should avoid applying content-neutral considerations as
conclusive considerations when answering this question. Moral
consistency should lead us to conclude that conscientious objections
to equality laws should not be tolerated and accommodated by
granting exemptions as judicial remedy because such objections rely
on unjustly intolerant, anti-liberal and morally repugnant values that
should not be tolerated by a tolerant-liberal democracy.
As to the more specific conclusions, those that relate to the case
of discriminating against gay people – within the context of pro-
viding services to the general public: the non-compromising ap-
proach that is suggested in this paper prevents people who hold
discriminatory views about gay people from acting on these views –
in almost all cases. This fairly radical perfectionist-liberal approach
results in harsh consequences with regard to people who may be
described as ‘otherwise moral’ and ways of life that may be described
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as ‘otherwise worthy’.72 This is a valid concern. People who are
generally moral, who live generally worthy life, may hold homo-
phobic views within the narrow context of gay marriage only. It may
be tempting to exempt these people from the application of equality
laws – within this narrow context only, subject to further conditions
(the existence of alternative service providers, for example). This
temptation should be resisted. If the objection to gay marriage forms
a tiny part of a person’s otherwise morally good character and
worthy life, then the harm that is caused to that person’s moral
personhood as a result of compelling them to refrain from acting on
their discriminatory values – is minimal. This harm is outweighed by
the pressing moral and social need to convey a message that acting
on discriminatory values will not be tolerated by the law. It is out-
weighed by the moral and social need to prevent discriminatory
practices to form a legitimate part of the public sphere.
But what if the objection to gay marriage forms a significant part
of one’s character, values and way of life? In that case, the harm
caused to one’s moral personhood as a result of preventing them
from acting on their discriminatory values – will also be significant.
However, if the objection to gay marriage forms a significant part of
one’s character, values and way of life – then that character is no
longer morally good and that way of life is no longer valuable. These
are the people and ways of life which are the reasons for enacting
equality laws. Tolerating them by granting exemptions from equality
laws will defeat the purpose of these laws.
Last concern within the context of objecting to equality laws
because one objects to gay marriage – is that gay or same-sex
marriage is a relatively new institution – and that social and moral
norms do not always change for the better as fast as we would like
them to. The law should, perhaps, be quicker when it comes to
allowing gay marriage, and a bit slower when it comes to enforcing
anti-discrimination laws within this context, at least in some typical
cases. This concern gives rise to difficult questions about the purpose
of law, the ability of the law to lead social changes, and the costs of
perfectionist-liberal intolerance. These questions will not be dis-
cussed here. The perfectionist-liberal approach that was applied here
may allow exceptions – in extremely rare cases. It may allow
72 And I thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this legitimate concern – and the other concern
that follows.
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homophobes to act on their homophobic views in the most excep-
tional cases – that will not be discussed here. The general approach,
though, remains intact: in a tolerant-liberal democracy, conscientious
objections to equality laws should not be tolerated and accommo-
dated by granting exemptions from these laws.
OPEN ACCESS
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons At-
tribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s)
and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
indicate if changes were made.
School of Law
Keele University, Keele, ST5 5BG, UK
E-mail: y.nehushtan@keele.ac.uk
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional aﬃliations.
YOSSI NEHUSHTAN266
